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I. INTRODUCTION: THE BROKEN PROOF STRUCTURES OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
LAW

A. The Wreck
The employment discrimination law1 of the United States is broken. The proof
structures or analytical frameworks2 that define how discrimination cases are litigated
and how they are analyzed at all dispositive stages are in a state of extreme disrepair.
Consequently, employment discrimination law is “running” poorly, and it is up to
Congress to fix it. Congress must pass legislation to clarify the proof structures. Such a
fix is badly needed to restore an acceptable level of clarity, predictability, and
functionality in employment discrimination litigation.
There are two proof structures under the disparate treatment theory of
discrimination:3 1) McDonnell Douglas or pretext; and 2) mixed motives. Among
several problems with these proof structures, the most significant is that no one knows
which one applies in any given case. Furthermore, it is a mystery whether uniform
disparate treatment proof structures are applicable to Title VII and the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). While there is uncertainty regarding

1

When using the term “employment discrimination law,” I am referring primarily to the following statutes
and the case law developed under those laws: Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88352 , 78 Stat 66 (1964) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. '' 2000e to 2000e-15); the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act, Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (1967) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§621633a); and the Americans with Disabilities Act, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (1990) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12117). There are other employment discrimination laws in the U.S.,
such as the newly enacted Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act, but most of the principles and
structures of employment discrimination law have been developed under the three acts.
2
“Proof structure” refers to what must be proven, in what order, and on whom the burden rests at each
stage. The Supreme Court in the decision in which it announced the McDonnell Douglas or pretext proof
structure described the thing it was creating: “The case before us raises significant questions as to the
proper order and nature of proof in actions under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.” McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 793 (1973).
3
Disparate treatment is intentional discrimination. See, e.g., International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United
States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977).
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uniformity for disparate treatment, it is clear that there is one disparate impact4 proof
structure for Title VII and one for the ADEA, and each has multiple problems and
uncertainties.
The proof structures are the engines of employment discrimination law, and their
current condition means that the wreck that is employment discrimination law needs an
overhaul. Given statues that simply say it is unlawful “to discriminate” in employment
terms “because of” sex, race, etc.,5 the courts have used the proof structures to develop
the procedural, evidentiary, and substantive law of employment discrimination law. Over
the course of the forty-three years or so that employment discrimination law has existed,6
the Supreme Court has created the proof structures, and both the Supreme Court and
Congress have clarified and modified them. Congress stepped in and modified or
clarified the proof structures legislatively when it deemed the Court to be moving in the
wrong direction in developing the proof structures, as it did in the Civil Rights Act of
1991.7 At this stage, Congress needs to take its turn again. It may soon have an
opportunity. Although the omnibus Civil Rights Act of 2008, which was introduced in

4

Disparate impact is a theory of unintentional discrimination in which liability is based on use of a facially
neutral practice or criterion that produces a statistically significant impact on a protected group, and the
practice cannot be justified. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335 n.15. Disparate impact has been described as
being based on either strict liability or negligence. See David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Negligent
Discrimination, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 899, 931-36 (1993).
5
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (a)(1) (Title VII); 29 U.S.C. § 623 (a)(1) (Age Discrimination in Employment
Act); 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (Americans with Disabilities Act).
6
Title VII is the oldest of our employment discrimination laws if we exclude the earlier Equal Pay Act,
which amended the Fair Labor Standards Act. Title VII was enacted in 1964, but its effective date was July
2, 1965. See Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 716, 78 Stat. 241, 266 (1964) (stating that the effective date shall be
one year after the date of enactment).
7
Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991). The 1991 Act was enacted after President Bush’s veto of the
similar Civil Rights Act of 1990. 136 CONG. REC. S16,418-19 (daily ed. Oct. 22, 1990). A principal
objective of the 1991 Act was to overturn several Supreme Court decisions. See H.R. Rep. No. 40, 102d
Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 2-4 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 694, 694-96.
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Congress, would amend the employment discrimination laws in many important ways,8
the bill as introduced would not repair the proof structures. There is no more important
task for Congress in fixing employment discrimination law than repairing the proof
structures.
Consider the following hypothetical discussion between a federal district judge
and his law clerk. The employment discrimination case described is far from unusual,
and the motion for summary judgment filed by the defendant is an everyday matter for
courts adjudicating employment discrimination cases. If the law is close to as confused
as I posit in this hypothetical (and it is), then the law is in urgent need of repair.
B. Ruling on a Motion for Summary Judgment: A Hypothetical Survey of the Wreck
“How do I rule on this motion, Clerk?” Judge Federal District bellows at his clerk.
“It’s very complicated, Judge. I am not sure how you should rule,” responds the
clerk sheepishly.
Judge District is preparing to rule on the defendant’s motion for summary
judgment in an employment discrimination case in which John Q. Employee, a fifty-yearold white male, was not hired after applying to and being interviewed by defendant
Employer. He filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
alleging discrimination based on race, sex, and age. In the job classification for which
the plaintiff applied, the employer has a much higher percentage of Caucasians and men
than African-Americans and women. After receiving his right to sue letter, Employee
filed suit in federal district court. After discovery, defendant Employer filed a motion for
summary judgment, seeking dismissal of the all of the plaintiff’s employment

8

H.R. 2159 110th Cong. (2008); S. 2554, 110th Cong. (2008). See Democrats Introduce Wide-Ranging
Bill to Bolster Employment Rights and Remedies, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 17, at A-3 (Jan. 28, 2008).
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discrimination claims. As is the custom of Judge District, he and his clerk read all the
briefs, and he discusses the case with his clerk.
“Well, Clerk, the briefs are clear and the law seems well defined. What do you
see as the problem?”
“Judge, I think employment discrimination law is broken. Until the Supreme
Court or Congress fixes it, I don’t know how you should rule on this motion.”
“That’s preposterous, Clerk. Your days on law review have made you too
contemplative. Employment discrimination law has been around for over forty years, and
I have seen it develop. It has been a very orderly process in which the Supreme Court
has explained the law in several landmark cases. Surely you are not suggesting that
Congress and the Supreme Court would leave the law so confused that judges could not
rule on motions for summary judgment.”
“I don’t think it is that simple, your Honor. With all due respect, I think that is
precisely the state of confusion in which Congress and the Court have left us.”
“Come now, we shall enjoy a nice discussion about employment discrimination
law and determine how to rule on this motion. I shall explain employment discrimination
law to you, and then you may write letters of apology to the Supreme Court and
Congress. Let us begin with the claims for race, sex, and age discrimination under the
disparate treatment theory. Disparate treatment is intentional discrimination, which the
Supreme Court once labeled as the “most easily understood type of discrimination.9 So,
even you, Clerk, should be able to understand disparate treatment, although as the Court
suggested, you may find disparate impact more difficult. Because the plaintiff asserts
both the disparate treatment and disparate impact theories, let’s resolve the easier one
9

International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977).
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first. As everyone knows, disparate treatment cases are analyzed, for purposes of
summary judgment, under the famous McDonnell Douglas10 or pretext analysis. It is a
three-step analysis. First, the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, which basically
requires that the plaintiff to prove that he or she is in a protected class, there is a job
available, and the plaintiff is basically qualified to perform the job, although the elements
vary somewhat depending on what type of adverse employment action the employer
took.11 At stage two, the employer has the burden of production to articulate a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for its employment decision. As everyone knows, stages one
and two are easy to satisfy, and virtually no cases are resolved at those stages.12 So, this
motion for summary judgment is likely to be resolved at stage three--the pretext stage.
Now, Clerk, I’ll grant you that the pretext stage is somewhat complex, and the Supreme
Court has found it necessary to clarify its meaning in a couple of cases, but the Court did
so.13 At stage three the task is to determine, on a motion for summary judgment, whether
there is sufficient evidence that the defendant’s articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason is a pretext for discrimination. That is, if we do not believe the reason given by
the employer for taking the adverse employment action, then we may infer that the real
reason is discriminatory, although we are not required to so infer.14 Now, I know that is a

10

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
See McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 279 & n. 6 (1976).
12
See, e.g., Miles v. MNC Corp., 750 F.2d 867, 870 (11th Cir. 1985); George Rutherglen, Abolition in a
Different Voice, 78 VA. L. REV. 1463, 1474 (1992) (“The fact that the plaintiff has made out a prima facie
case in McDonnell Douglas usually is of no consequence because the plaintiff's burden of making out that
case, and the defendant's rebuttal burden of showing a `legitimate nondiscriminatory’ reason, are so easily
satisfied. Almost all individual cases under McDonnell Douglas come down to a determination whether the
plaintiff has proved that the `legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason’ offered by the defendant is really a
pretext for discrimination.”).
13
See St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993); Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc.,
530 U.S. 133 (2000).
14
See Reeves, 530 U.S. at 146-47.
11
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bit complicated, but the Court has been clear about this, and surely we can decide the
disparate treatment claim under the analysis I have explained, Clerk.”
“Judge, I am loathe to disagree with you, but I think there are a number of
problems that make it much more complicated and less certain than you explained. First,
it is not clear that the McDonnell Douglas analysis applies to plaintiff Employee’s
disparate treatment claims.”
“Heresy!” exclaimed the indignant Judge District.
“No, Judge. As I am sure you know, the Supreme Court announced an alternative
proof structure or analysis for disparate treatment claims in Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins.15 That case set forth the mixed-motives analysis, under which there are two
stages. First, the plaintiff must prove that the protected characteristic was a motivating or
substantial factor (the case produced no majority opinion on the standard of causation),
and then the defendant could still win the case and avoid liability by proving the samedecision defense—that it would have taken the same adverse action for
nondiscriminatory reasons. Congress stepped in to modify and clarify the Price
Waterhouse proof structure in the Civil Rights Act of 1991.16 First, Congress selected
“motivating factor” as the standard of causation.17 Second, Congress changed the samedecision defense so that it does not operate as a complete affirmative defense, precluding
liability, but instead limits the remedies that are available if the defendant “demonstrates”

15

490 U.S. 228 (1989).
Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 107, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991), codified at scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. See supra
note 7.
17
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m).
16
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(satisfies the burden of persuasion) that it would have made the same employment
decision absent the discriminatory reason.”18
“Yes, of course, Clerk. I know about Price Waterhouse and the 1991 Act,”
interjected Judge District. “But many more disparate treatment cases are analyzed under
McDonnell Douglas or pretext because, as you should have learned in law school, the
Price Waterhouse or mixed-motives analysis applies to only cases in which there is direct
evidence of discrimination. There are far more cases involving circumstantial evidence
of discrimination than those involving direct evidence.”
“Judge, that was once the state of the law, but do you remember the Supreme
Court’s decision in 2003 in Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa?19
“Yes, I read it, but it does not say very much, and it did not change anything I just
explained to you.”
“Well, your Honor, I certainly agree that the opinion says little, but the opinion
and its negative pregnant footnote20 lead some to believe that the case necessarily
changed the way disparate treatment cases are analyzed.”
“Yes, I have heard that some academics have read the case as abrogating
McDonnell Douglas,21 but the Court did not say that. It is very presumptuous of those
ivory tower law professors to suggest that the Court sub silento overruled a well-

18

42 U.S.C. §2000e-5(g)(2)(B).
539 U.S. 90 (2003).
20
Id. at 94 n.1
21
See, e.g., Henry L. Chambers, Jr., The Effect of Eliminating Distinctions Among Title VII Disparate
Treatment Cases, 57 SMU L. REV. 83, 95-99 (2004); Jeffrey A. Van Detta, “Le Roi Est Mort; Vie le Roi!”
An Essay on the Quiet Demise of McDonnell-Douglas and the Transformation of Every Title VII Case After
Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa into a “Mixed Motives” Case, 52 DRAKE L. REV. 71, 72 (2003); William R.
Corbett, An Allegory of the Cave and the Desert Palace, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 1549 (2005); William R.
Corbett, McDonnell Douglas, 1973-2003: May You Rest in Peace? 6 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 199 (2003)
[hereinafter, Corbett, McDonnell Douglas].
19
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established analysis that it had carefully developed over a period of more than thirty
years.”
“Your Honor, the problem for us is that the Court clearly did say in Desert Palace
that there is no requirement in the Civil Rights Act of 1991 that a plaintiff produce direct
evidence in order to be entitled to a “motivating factor” jury instruction.22 With the
dividing line erased between cases that are to be analyzed under the pretext analysis and
those to be analyzed under mixed-motives, how do we know which one to use?”
“That is an interesting point, Clerk. How have the courts of appeals resolved that
issue?”
“In short, not well, and the Supreme Court has denied certiorari in cases raising
the issue.23 Some courts have said that Desert Palace did not change anything. Others,
unsure about how to decide which analysis to apply, have applied both.24 One court held
that McDonnell Douglas continues to apply to single-motive cases while a motivating
factor analysis applies to mixed-motives cases.”25
“But, Clerk, how can we preserve distinctions between the analyses of single- and
mixed-motives cases if Desert Palace erased the dividing line? How does a court know
which type it is dealing with?”
“Judge, the Sixth Circuit in White v. Baxter Healthcare Corp. seemed to rely on
the complaint and how the plaintiff pled his claims. The court said that the plaintiff

22

Desert Palace, 539 U.S. at 101.
See, e.g., Read v. B.T. Alex Brown, 2003 WL 21754966 (5th Cir. July 30, 2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct.
1415 (2004).
24
See, e.g., Diamond v. Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310, 318 (4th Cir. 2005) (plaintiff may
survive summary judgment by prevailing under either of the two proof structures). For an opinion
summarizing the positions of the various circuits, see White v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., ___ F. 3d ___, 103
Fair Emp. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1121, 2008 WL 2607893 (6th Cir. 2008).
25
See White v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., ___ F.3d __ (6th Cir. 2008).

23
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brought one claim pursuant to one section of Title VII and one pursuant to another
section.”26
“Depending on the pleading to separate them does not seem fair or reasonable.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure establish a notice pleading system in which
specificity is not required.”
“Indeed, your Honor. Reliance on how a claim is pled to decide which proof
structure applies seems ill-advised and contrary to the Federal Rules and Supreme Court
precedent.27 The Court rejected a requirement that pleadings must be strictly tied to the
proof structures in Swierkiewicz v. Sorenma N.A.”28
“Are there any other and better resolutions of this mess, Clerk?”
“Well, Judge, the most creative and ambitious resolution is that of the Fifth
Circuit in Rachid v. Jack in the Box, Inc.29 In an age discrimination case, the Fifth
Circuit reasoned that Desert Palace did effect a significant change. The court announced
a `modified McDonnell Douglas’ analysis in which the first two parts of the pretext
analysis remain unchanged, and only the third part is modified. At part three, a plaintiff
may prevail by proving either pretext or motivating factor.30 If the plaintiff proves
motivating factor, then the same-decision defense is available to the defendant.”

26

Id. at ___-___. The court said the single-motive claim was brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(a)(1)
and the mixed-motives claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m). The district court, in discussing the
claim analyzed under pretext and the claim analyzed under mixed motives referred to the type of evidence
presented in support of each (circumstantial and direct, respectively), although the court also discussed the
Desert Palace abrogation of that line. See White v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., No. 05-71201, 2007 WL
1119881 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 16, 2007).
27
See, e.g., Diamond v. Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310, 317 n.3 (4th Cir. 2005 (“Whether
[plaintiff] pled a mixed-motive claim is irrelevant . . . because ` a case need not be characterized or labeled
at the outset. . . . [T]he complaint itself need not contain more than the allegation that the adverse
employment action was taken because of a protected characteristic.’”) (quoting Costa v. Desert Palace, 299
F.3d 838, 856 n.7 (9th Cir. 2002)).
28
534 U.S. 506 (2002).
29
376 F.2d 305 (5th Cir. 2004).
30
Id. at 312.
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“That’s more like it, Clerk. The Fifth Circuit has made things more manageable
with that approach. How have other courts reacted?”
“No other circuit has adopted the `modified McDonnell Douglas’ approach,31 and
even some panels within the Fifth Circuit have seemed unsure that Rachid is the
framework that is generally applicable to all disparate treatment cases.32 Though the
combined analysis does make our job easier, I do not understand the continuing relevance
of the pretext prong. If motivating factor is enough, plaintiffs opposing motions for
summary judgment should always insist on having their cases analyzed under motivating
factor rather than pretext.”
“Another good point, Clerk. I like McDonnell Douglas, and I am very
comfortable analyzing summary judgments under it. It is like a comfortable, old blanket.
Let’s say that pretext analysis continues to apply to motions for summary judgment, but
does not apply thereafter. That should work, right?”
“Judge, that is what the Ninth Circuit said in its en banc decision in Desert
Palace.33 However, could we apply one standard to analyzing a motion for summary
judgment and then apply a different standard in the jury instructions? Isn’t summary
judgment supposed to determine, under the same standard applicable to a motion for
judgment as a matter of law, whether there is any need for a jury resolution? It seems to
me that we need to apply the same analysis to summary judgment that we will later apply
to determining whether the jury gets to decide the case, and if so under what
instructions.”

31

See White, ___ F.3d at ____.
See Greene v. DaimlerChrysler Servs. N.A.,128 Fed. Appx. 353, 356 n.7 (5th Cir. 2005) (stating that
court need not consider effect of Desert Palace and Rachid on case).
33
Costa v. Desert Palace, 299 F.3d 838, 854 (9th Cir.2002), aff’d, 539 U.S. 90 (2003).

32
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“That is a good point, Clerk. But I am going to analyze this case at the summary
judgment stage under McDonnell Douglas. The appellate courts can take the pretext
analysis from me when they pry it from my cold, dead fingers.”
“Okay, Judge. And the jury instructions will be what? Pretext-based? What if
the defendant asks for the same-decision defense jury instruction?”
“We’ll cross that bridge when we get to it. It will not be an issue if I grant the
motion for summary judgment. I want you to analyze the disparate treatment claim under
McDonnell Douglas, and then for good measure, analyze it under mixed motives, too, to
see if the result is any different. Wait a minute; that will be a problem if it comes out
differently. Do that combined, modified analysis the Fifth Circuit made up in Rachid.
That should cover all bases. ”
“Okay, Judge. How about the disparate treatment claim based on age?”
“Same thing. Why should it be different from race and sex?”
“Some courts have said that whatever the Supreme Court did in Desert Palace, it
had no effect on the Age Discrimination in Employment Act.34 Thus, the mixed-motives
analysis applicable to the age claim could be the Price Waterhouse version rather than the
Civil Rights Act of 1991 version.35
“But you said the Fifth Circuit Rachid case was an age discrimination case. The
Fifth Circuit did not seem bothered by the distinction that you just made: that the Civil
Rights Act of 1991 did not amend the ADEA.”

34

See, e.g., Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 526 F.3d 356 (8th Cir. 2008) (explaining that Desert Palace,
which interpreted language in the Civil Rights Act of 1991, does not affect the application of Price
Waterhouse to ADEA cases).
35
Id.
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“Right, Judge. The Fifth Circuit dispatched with that issue expeditiously,
reasoning that the ADEA and Title VII statutory prohibitions are similar. 36 But some
other courts have rejected the Fifth Circuit’s harmonization or unification of the analyses,
finding inadequate support for it in the statutes.37 I think the Fifth Circuit did it as a
matter of convenience.”
“Clerk, my head is beginning to hurt. I am all for convenience, and I think it may
be in the interest of the courts and the public to simplify this law, so apply the modified
McDonnell Douglas analysis to the race, sex, and age disparate treatment claims. I see
no reason why the analysis for age discrimination claims should be different from race
and sex.”
“As you wish, Judge, but the Supreme Court consistently has said that there are
differences between age discrimination on the one hand, and race and sex discrimination
on the other. For example, most recently the Court reiterated this in Meacham v. Knolls
Atomic Power Laboratory.38 Still, on the specific issue of the proof structure applicable
to intentional discrimination cases, I agree with you.”
“Good! Then apply the modified McDonnell Douglas analysis and prepare
proposed reasons for judgment.”
“Okay, Judge. Now about the reverse discrimination issue, how do you want to
handle that?”
“Apply the modified McDonnell Douglas analysis. Is there anything else?”
“Yes, Judge. As you know we have a white male asserting race and sex
discrimination claims. Do you want me to make adjustments to the analysis because the
36

Rachid, 376 F.3d at 311.
See Gross, 526 F.3d at 360-61.
38
128 S. Ct. 2395 (2008).

37
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claim is reverse discrimination, meaning a case with a plaintiff who is a member of a
group that historically has not been a primary target of discrimination?”39
“My word, Clerk, what adjustments would you make, and why would you make
them?”
“Some courts have modified the McDonnell Douglas analysis in reverse
discrimination cases by requiring more proof to establish a prima facie case.40 Usually,
courts that do this say that they require evidence of `background circumstances,’ which
suggest that this is an unusual employer that discriminates against a historically favored
group.”41
“Now, Clerk, why would we modify the analysis for reverse discrimination cases?
Doing so seems discriminatory to me, which is quite ironic given that we are trying to
enforce antidiscrimination laws.”
“Judge, some courts have refused to modify the analysis at least in large part for
that reason.42 It is important to remember, however, that employment discrimination law
makes a number of distinctions, and thus it obviously does discriminate.43 The important

39

Charles A. Sullivan, Circling Back to the Obvious: The Convergence of Traditional and Reverse
Discrimination in Title VII Proof, 46 WM & MARY L. REV. 1031, 1035 (2004) [hereinafter Sullivan,
Circling].
40
See, e.g., Duffy v. Wolle, 123 F.3d 1026, 1036 (8th Cir. 1997); Parker v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 652
F.2d 1012, 1017 (D.C. Cir. 1981); see also; Sullivan, Circling, supra note 39; Timothy K. Giordano,
Comment, Different Treatment for Non-Minority Plaintiffs Under Title VII: A Call for Modification of the
Background Circumstances Test to Ensure That Separate is Equal, 49 EMORY L.J. 993 (2000); Donald T.
Kramer, What Constitutes Reverse or Majority Race or National Origin Discrimination Violative of
Federal Constitution or Statutes—Private Employment Cases, 150 A.L.R. Fed. 1 (1998); Ryan M. Peck,
Title VII Is Color Blind: The Law of Reverse Discrimination, 75 J. KAN. BAR ASS’N 20 (June 2006).
41
See, e.g., Murray v. Thistledown Racing Club, Inc., 770 F.2d 63, 67 (6th Cir. 1985); see also Sullivan,
Circling, supra note 39, at 1065-71 (discussing background circumstances).
42
See, e.g., Sullivan, Circling, supra note 39, at 1080-84.
43
For example, the bona fide occupational defense applies to sex, religion, and national origin, but not race
and color. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (e). Furthermore, the Supreme Court has recognized that under certain
circumstances, employers can develop and maintain affirmative action plans. See, e.g., Johnson v.
Transportation Agency of Santa Clara County, 480 U.S. 616 (1987); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber,
443 U.S. 193 (1979); DeCorte v. Jordan, 497 F.3d 433 (5th Cir. 2007).
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question is whether there is a solid rationale for distinguishing between the proof
structure applied to traditional discrimination cases and that applied to reverse
discrimination cases. The best reason seems to be based on the presumptions underlying
the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case. As we discussed earlier, all the prima facie
case essentially requires is that a plaintiff prove that she is in a protected class, is
basically qualified for the job in question, and a job exists for which plaintiff was not
chosen. Although this is easily satisfied in most cases, the Court has explained that the
prima facie case rules out the two most common reasons for a person not getting a job:
no job exists or the person is not qualified.44 With the most common nondiscriminatory
reasons ruled out, the Court believed that discrimination occurs often enough to make it
reasonable to infer discrimination, subject to rebuttal.45 However, that same inference
may not be as reasonable for reverse discrimination because historically such
discrimination has not been common. So, as you can see, when you think about the
underlying rationale for the proof structure, modifying the prima facie case for reverse
discrimination cases by requiring proof of additional background circumstances makes
sense. However, the modification has been very controversial. One court expressed its
consternation by saying that cases which apply the background circumstances
requirement in reverse discrimination cases are inconsistent with antidiscrimination
statutes.”46
“I understand, Clerk. I don’t want to jump into that controversy, so don’t modify
the prima facie case with a ‘background circumstances’ requirement even if it makes
sense to do so. Besides, with more minority-owned businesses and the current emphasis
44

International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 358 n.77 (1977).
Id.
46
See Lind v. City of Battle Creek, 681 N.W.2d 334 (Mich. 2004).
45
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on diversity in the workplace, I suppose reverse discrimination may be more common
than it used to be. Are we done with the disparate treatment claims?”
“I think so, Judge, but if the age discrimination claim is a reverse discrimination
claim, as it seems it may be, then we do not need to apply any analysis to it. It can be
dismissed as a matter of law. Younger people cannot claim that they were discriminated
against in favor of older people on the basis of age.”
“Now, wait a minute. Why not? The Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA) says `age,’ which could go either way—older or younger. Furthermore, I know
the Supreme Court has approved reverse discrimination claims under Title VII,47
“Yes, Judge, that is all true, but the Supreme Court held that the ADEA does not
provide for reverse discrimination claims in General Dynamics Land Systems, Inc. v.
Cline.48
“That does not make sense to me. The statute says “because of . . . age,”49 and
does not say anything about younger or older. I recently read about a British case in
which a younger plaintiff sued for age discrimination and won.”50
“Shall I write that, notwithstanding what the Court said in General Dynamics
Land Systems, the ADEA should be interpreted to permit reverse age discrimination
claims and cite the British case?”
“No, Clerk, I don’t think so. Some justices on the Supreme Court don’t like to
see any foreign law cited.51 If the age claim is a reverse discrimination claim, grant the
summary judgment for the defendant, citing General Dynamics Land Systems. Okay,
47
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surely that takes care of the disparate treatment claims. Let’s move on to disparate
impact. This should be much easier than disparate treatment because Congress codified
the disparate impact proof structure in the Civil Rights Act of 1991.52 You know the
three-part analysis: 1) prima facie case consisting of a) employment practice that b)
causes c) a statistically significant disparity; 2) employer’s defense of business necessity
and job relatedness; and 3) alternative employment practice.”53
“Judge, I know that is how courts see it, although the structure established by
Congress in the Civil Right Act of 1991 is not that clear. For example, the statute does
not say that alternative employment practice (AEP) is the third stage of a three-part
analysis.54 Moreover, it is almost impossible to separate AEP from business necessity
and job relatedness (BN/JR). How can a practice be a necessity if there is an alternative
practice available that is nearly as effective and less discriminatory? Courts generally
have not been able to separate BN/JR and AEP into two stages.”55
“Okay, well, treat BN/JR and AEP as two separate stages anyway. Any more
problems?”
“Working backwards, my biggest problem at stage two is that Congress did not
attempt to define BN/JR, and courts have struggled to define it.56 As some have
explained it, before the Civil Rights Act of 1991, the Supreme Court seemed to apply a
sliding scale approach to BN/JR, being more deferential or less deferential to the
employer depending on the type of job and what was at stake in second guessing the
52
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employer’s determination of business necessity. Also, what did Congress have in mind
by making the defense two parts—business necessity and job related? Are we really
supposed to analyze both? Can a practice be a business necessity without being job
related? Isn’t job related redundant?”
“Clerk, I understand, but the statutory language is crystal clear. Even if you think
job related is redundant, analyze both. As far as the appropriate standard for BN/JR
survey the case law and pick one. Any other problems?”
“Yes, regarding the prima facie case, there are problems with all three parts.
First, what constitutes an employment practice is not clear. For example, the Supreme
Court in the case first holding that disparate impact is actionable under the ADEA, Smith
v. City of Jackson, held that the employer’s pay raise formula was not an employment
practice.57 One could attribute that to its being an age case, but what constitutes an
employment practice also has been vexing in Title VII cases. For example, in EEOC v.
Joe’s Stone Crab,58 the Eleventh Circuit said it found no employment practice in the
employer’s hiring procedures, although the dissent had no difficulty finding practices.”
“So you will have to apply an amorphous standard to what constitutes an
employment practice. Just add that to the amorphous standard for the defense of BN/JR.
What are the problems with the rest of the PFC?”
“The Supreme Court announced a specific causation standard in Wards Cove
Packing v. Atonio.59 Although Congress overturned most of Wards Cove in the Civil
Rights Act of 1991, it appears to have codified the specific causation requirement.60
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Here’s the problem in this case: the plaintiff claims disparate impact in refusal to hire
based on race, sex, and age. Let’s put the age disparate impact claim to one side because
it must be analyzed according to a different disparate impact proof structure. As for the
race and sex claims, there is a problem because the employer has many more men and
whites in the job classification for which Plaintiff was denied employment and many
more men and whites in its workforce as a whole.”
“Ah, checkmate, Clerk. The Supreme Court explained in Connecticut v. Teal that
the bottom line cannot be used to defeat a claim of discrimination.61 That is, if a practice
or criterion is excluding a group disproportionately, it is no answer that the group is
proportionately represented in the employer’s workforce.”
“True, Judge, but how do you reconcile that principle with Livingston v. Roadway
Express, Inc.62 In that case, the employer had a maximum height requirement for drivers.
The tall male applicant who was denied a job sued, asserting disparate impact. The court
rejected his claim, noting that the employer’s workforce had 189 male drivers and two
female drivers. The court tried to distinguish Connecticut v. Teal, but the ground of
distinction made no difference. Then the court buttressed its conclusion that the claim
failed by noting that the case was a reverse discrimination case and saying the
background circumstances requirement applicable to disparate treatment reverse
discrimination cases also applies to disparate impact cases.”
“I admit that Livingston poses some enigmas. How do you resolve them, Clerk?”
“Livingston exemplifies a couple of the most significant unresolved issues about
disparate impact. First, is disparate impact really about individual rights rather than
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group rights? In Connecticut v. Teal,63 the Court insisted that employment discrimination
law protects individual rights, not group rights.64 The dissent in Teal disagreed, saying
the Court was confusing the goal of Title VII with the legal theories for accomplishing
that goal; while disparate treatment is about proving discrimination against individuals,
disparate impact is about proving discrimination with reference to a group.65 If disparate
impact is about protecting individuals against discrimination only as members of a group,
then Livingston makes sense, as the employer hired many men and certainly did not
discriminate against men. On the other hand, if disparate impact protects individuals as
individuals, then the plaintiff should have recovered. Second, in what group must the
disparate impact be manifested? The actual workforce of the employer or some
hypothetical group mirroring the general public that could have applied for the job?66 In
Livingston, for example, there was no underrepresentation of men in the employer’s
workforce, although everyone knows that a height limitation would disproportionately
screen out men in a hypothetical applicant pool. In Livingston, looking at the PFC from
the top (from the employment practice downward) it looks like a fairly strong disparate
impact case. However, looking at it from the bottom (from the workforce upward) it
looks like a nonexistent disparate impact case. There is yet another issue in Livingston.
Should disparate impact theory even apply to reverse discrimination cases?67 Although
the court stated that it would impose the additional background circumstances
requirement for disparate impact in reverse discrimination cases, the court could have
63
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considered whether disparate impact even was intended to protect members of groups
against whom there is no history of discrimination.

This is a very controversial issue

which also may raise constitutional concerns. So far, the scant case law on the issue
recognizes the applicability of disparate impact to reverse discrimination cases, 68 but the
issue has not been thoroughly discussed in a difficult case. Because there are more
Caucasians and men in the job classification for which the plaintiff applied, we may have
such a case.”
“Clerk, what constitutional issues are implicated if I rule that disparate impact
does not apply to reverse discrimination cases?”
“The argument is that a judicial decision limiting disparate impact to traditional
discrimination cases is a racial classification that is subject to strict scrutiny analysis
under the equal protection clause, and therefore probably constitutionally infirm.69
However, there are arguments in the academic literature to the contrary.”70
“Clerk, we will not risk that constitutional fight. We will apply disparate impact
to the reverse discrimination claims in the case before us without discussing the issue,
much as the court did in Livingston. However, do not add the background circumstances
requirement.”
“Okay, your Honor. You are aware, of course, that the disparate impact analysis
under the ADEA is different from that under Title VII. At a minimum, the statutory
language requires that the defense of “reasonable factors other than age” replace business
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necessity and job relatedness as the applicable affirmative defense.71 In Meacham v.
Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory the Supreme Court recently explained this difference
and the fact that there is no stage three rebuttal in the analysis analogous to “alternative
employment practices.”72 Indeed, until the Supreme Court’s 2005 decision in Smith v.
City of Jackson, it was not resolved that disparate impact theory was available under the
ADEA.73 The Supreme Court’s explanation of the ADEA disparate impact analysis in
Smith seems to make it very unlikely that plaintiffs will prevail.74 The Court, however,
did clarify in Meacham that RFOA is an affirmative defense for which the burden of
persuasion is on the defendant.”
“So, Clerk, I question why the Supreme Court and Congress have disfavored age
discrimination by making it harder for plaintiffs to recover, but I accept your explanation
of the differences.”
“You realize the analysis I do under both disparate treatment and disparate impact
will be fraught with uncertainty, Judge?”
“Yes, Clerk, I now understand that, but I find it baffling that Congress and the
Supreme Court have not heretofore seen fit to provide certainty regarding the basic tools
we must use at the key stages in litigation of employment discrimination cases.”75
“Well, your Honor, Congress stepped up to the plate and did significant
revamping and clarification of both disparate impact and disparate treatment in the Civil
71
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Rights Act of 1991. Perhaps it will do so again. But I should begin work on your
opinion because that hope does not help us now.”
II. HOW DID THE WRECK OCCUR?
The odyssey of the proof structures is well chronicled, so I will render it here in
succinct form.
A. Disparate Treatment: Pretext and Mixed Motives from McDonnell Douglas and Price
Waterhouse to the Civil Rights Act of 1991 to Desert Palace
The two proof structures were created by the Supreme Court, the pretext structure
in McDonnell Douglas v. Green76 in 1973, and the mixed-motives structure in Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins77 in 1989. Although both were created by the Court, mixedmotives later would be modified and codified by Congress.
The Court held the pretext analysis applicable in a reverse discrimination case
without much discussion of how it applies in McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation
Co.78 The McDonnell Douglas pretext analysis was further developed in a series of
Supreme Court decisions: Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine,79 St.
Mary=s Honor Center v. Hicks,80 and Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc. 81 The
Supreme Court never has held that the pretext analysis is applicable to analyze ADEA
cases (although it assumed it in Consolidated Coin Caterers),82 and lower courts
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routinely have applied it. The Court seems to have approved the applicability of the
pretext analysis to disabilities claims under the ADA in Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez.83
The court announced the alternative proof structure, mixed motives, in Price
Waterhouse. The plurality opinion and Justice O’Connor’s concurrence applied different
standards to the plaintiff’s prima facie case, “motivating factor” applied by the plurality,
and “substantial factor” by the concurrence. After Price Waterhouse, most courts
applied substantial factor. Courts also grappled with the issue of under which proof
structure any particular case should be analyzed. Most circuits seized upon the dividing
line cited by the O’Connor concurrence: cases in which there was direct evidence were
analyzed under mixed-motives, and circumstantial evidence cases were analyzed under
pretext.84
Congress made some changes in at least one disparate treatment proof structure in
the Civil Rights Act of 1991. Given the splintered Court decision in Price Waterhouse,
Congress clarified and fixed the mixed-motives proof structure. Congress codified
“motivating factor” as the causation standard in the plaintiff’s prima face case rather than
“substantial factor.”85 Congress also changed the analysis of Price Waterhouse by
providing that the same-decision defense is not a complete defense, avoiding liability.
Instead liability is still imposed even if the employer satisfies its burden on the samedecision defense; instead, it limits the remedies that are available.86 Did Congress intend
in the Civil Rights Act of 1991 to make any changes in the pretext analysis? Congress
did not say. Did the new statutory version of mixed motives apply to the Age
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Discrimination in Employment Act, which was not amended by the Civil Rights Act of
1991? Congress did not say, but it placed the new statutory analysis in Title VII. Many
courts said that the Price Waterhouse version of mixed motives continued to apply to
ADEA disparate treatment claims.
As long as courts maintained a dividing line between cases to be analyzed under
pretext and those to be analyzed under mixed motives, it was reasonable for courts to
continue using the two proof structures and the rich body of case law developed under
them. However, the Supreme Court obliterated this order when it held in Desert Palace,
Inc. v. Costa that direct evidence is not required for a plaintiff to be entitled to a
motivating factor jury instruction.87 With that, the Court erased the line separating the
cases analyzed under pretext and those analyzed under mixed motives. The Court based
its holding on the fact that the language added by the Civil Rights Act of 1991 did not say
anything about “motivating factor” being limited to direct evidence cases. Did
elimination of the dividing line mean that all disparate treatment cases were to be
analyzed under mixed motives? The Court declined to say.88 The lower courts were left
with no guidance on deciding what to do with the two disparate treatment proof
structures.
B. Disparate Impact: From Griggs to Wards Cove to the Civil Rights Act of 1991
The history of disparate impact starts with the Supreme Court’s recognition of the
theory in 1971 in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.89 Between Griggs and the codification of
disparate impact in the Civil Rights Act of 1991, several major Supreme Court cases
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developed the proof structure. In1982 in Connecticut v. Teal,90 the Court announced that
if an employment practice causes a disparate impact, an employer cannot defend and win
the case by fixing the disparate impact at the bottom line—by adjusting its numbers so
that the group adversely affected by the practice is adequately represented in the work
force or job classification. In 1988 in Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust91 the Court
held that disparate impact analysis applies to subjective employment practices. Then, in
Ward’s Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio92 in 1989, the Court radically changed the disparate
impact analysis, making business necessity easier to satisfy and placing the burden of
persuasion on the plaintiff. Congress took aim at Wards Cove in the Civil Rights Act of
1991 and created a statutory version of the disparate impact proof structure that modified
most of the Ward’s Cove version of the analysis, except the requirement of specific
causation between the employment practice and the statistical disparity.93 Unfortunately,
the statutory version developed by Congress presumed that the terms it used, such as
“business necessity” and “job related” were adequately defined by pre-Ward Cove case
law. They were not. The Court held in Smith v. City of Jackson94 in 2005 that the
disparate impact analysis, although not the one created by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, is
applicable under the ADEA. The Court continued to clarify the differences between the
ADEA and Title analyses in 2008 in Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory.95
III. LEGISLATIVELY FIXING THE PROOF STRUCTURES
A. Legislate Like It’s 1991
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The proof structures, even the ones retrofitted in the Civil Rights Act of 1991, are
fraught with problems, enigmas, and conundrums.96 These frameworks are used by
attorneys and judges to analyze all employment discrimination cases, and they are used
by courts to rule on dispositive motions and to instruct juries. Thus, employment
discrimination law is badly broken and in desperate need of repair.
Congress must answer the call and repair the law by repairing the proof
structures.97 Why Congress rather than the Supreme Court? First, obviously Congress is
better able to repair all the problems in one piece of legislation, whereas the Court would
have to find cases presenting the issues and grant certiorari in a number of cases to fix
them all. The problems are numerous enough and fundamental enough that they should
be repaired in one fell swoop. While one may argue that problems can be resolved by the
courts by permitting time for experimentation, this repair work is long overdue. Second,
not only is the Court unable to deal with all of the problems in a short period of time, it
has not demonstrated a willingness to fix the problems it could have over long periods of
time. How hard would it have been to clarify the effect of Desert Palace on the disparate
treatment proof structures, given a number of petitions for certiorari in cases raising the
issues? Finally, Congress demonstrated in the 1991 Act that it can identify specific
problems (often created by specific Supreme Court decisions) and fix them in a single
piece of legislation. One may respond that the political wrangling surrounding the failed
96
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Civil Rights Act of 1990 and the successful 1991 Act demonstrate a weakness of
Congress that led to some of the current problems.98 While that is true, the 1991 Act is
still impressive for its recognition of fundamental problems with the proof structures
revealed by the existing case law and its attempt to address them by drawing on the
available case law. Thus, it is time for Congress to fix employment discrimination law as
it did in the Civil Rights Act of 1991. As in 1991, the fix will not resolve all issues well,
but Congress has the superior competence to fix numerous problems identified by and
developed in the case law.
Before suggesting the specific changes that I think Congress should make, I offer
a few observations regarding the limited scope of what this Article proposes. First, this is
more about mechanics than theory, and a repair rather than building something new.
Much academic scholarship focuses on theory to explain the failures and deficiencies of
current employment discrimination law,99 and some goes on to use theory to recommend
reconceptualizations of the law. 100 While those endeavors are important and worthwhile,
rather than building something new, I will limit the changes to fixing problems with
current parts. A related point is that the repairs I recommend, like the approach Congress
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took in 1991, will use available parts and not anything that has to be custom ordered.
The changes that I recommend do not effect a reconceptualization or reinvention of
employment discrimination law; instead, they are directed at the more modest goal, for
example, of selecting from among the causation standards that have been used by the
courts the best one in view of the state of the law and society.
The repair job that I recommend is limited in scope and ambition for at least two
reasons. First, I want to recommend something that has a good chance of becoming law;
it should be politically feasible. Employment discrimination law is almost like a “third
rail” in politics, as the failed 1990 Act and the successful 1991 Act demonstrate. The
1990-1991 efforts show that it is hard enough to muster the political will to fix
identifiable problems in Supreme Court decisions, but it can be done. In the 1991 Act,
Congress identified the Supreme Court cases it was addressing, and in each case,
Congress drew from existing case law, often from opinions in the cases it was targeting to
codify a repair.101 This is a good approach with a chance of political success. Identifying
problems in court opinions, particularly Supreme Court opinions, shows that they are real
problems that probably raise their heads frequently in litigation of cases. Furthermore,
identifying problems in cases demonstrates that the courts have tried their hand at fixing
it, and now it is Congress’ turn. In addition to political viability, there are several other
reasons that I favor this approach. Courts often have considered a range of answers, so
the case law often includes most viable solutions. But not always. Why not do
something truly revolutionary, such as rejecting all generally prevailing standards of
causation that have been used in employment discrimination law—sole cause, but for,
101
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substantial factor, motivating factor—and instead adopt increased chance/lost chance
methodology from tort law to have courts and juries determine the percentage chance that
discrimination caused an adverse employment action? Besides the unlikelihood of
legislative success, there is another reason. Courts and lawyers in general do not like
changes; they are comfortable with that with which they are familiar. For example, I
thought that Desert Palace implicitly made it clear that the McDonnell Douglas pretext
analysis could not be maintained as it had before that decision, but I also predicted that
courts and lawyers would cling tenaciously to the analysis that had become common and
comfortable in its thirty-plus years of existence.102 Whatever legislation Congress enacts
will be interpreted by the courts, and the courts will do a better job interpreting and
applying legislation based on concepts developed in the existing case law. For example,
the proof structure for disparate impact in the 1991 Act103 is not clearly the three-part
analysis that Congress probably intended and that courts have interpreted it as codifying.
However, because Congress used terms and concepts developed in the case law, courts
have resorted to the prior case law in interpreting the legislation. Courts are comfortable
with what they know and what has a body of case law development. Thus, Congress
should work with the parts the courts have provided where possible so that courts will
know how to drive it when Congress sends it back. We might prefer to see Congress give
us a Rolls Royce, but we should be satisfied with a smooth-running version of the Chevy
or Ford we took in to the shop. We won’t be as worried about what happens to it when
we take it out and drive it around every day.
And now, we begin the repair job.
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B. Fixing Disparate Treatment
Because most employment discrimination cases are individual disparate treatment
cases and the mystery of what proof structure applies was raised by a Supreme Court
opinion, this is the most important and most needed repair. As a starting point, Congress
codified the mixed-motives proof structure with a “motivating factor” standard and a
same-decision limitation on remedies in the Civil Rights Act of 1991.104 The Supreme
Court in Desert Palace read this amendment as not limiting the “motivating factor”
standard to cases involving direct evidence. As argued in this article and elsewhere, once
the dividing line between cases analyzed under mixed motives and those analyzed under
pretext was erased, someone needs to say whether both proof structures continue to exist,
and if they do, what is the new dividing line. In the aftermath of Desert Palace, Congress
could do any of the following: 1) Preserve the two proof structures and either overturn
Desert Palace by reinstalling the prior direct evidence-circumstantial evidence dividing
line or creating a new one; 2) Merge the two analyses into one new one along the lines of
what the Fifth Circuit did in Rachid v. Jack in the Box105; or 3) Abrogate the pretext
analysis by expressly making a single statutory proof structure applicable to all individual
disparate treatment cases, and consider any modifications of the current mixed-motives
statutory structure that seem advisable in light of the abrogation of the pretext analysis
and adoption of a single standard.
1. Congress Should Not Change the Result of Desert Palace
Option 1 should not be followed. Although the holding of Desert Palace, that the
Civil Rights Act of 1991 does not require direct evidence to invoke the mixed-motives
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proof structure, is not the only possible interpretation of the 1991 amendment, Desert
Palace on balance did a good thing. It does not appear that Congress had any notion of
abrogating the McDonnell Douglas pretext analysis or erasing the well-known dividing
line between pretext cases and mixed-motives cases with the 1991 amendments. Instead,
the codification of mixed motives was directed at fixing the proof structure articulated by
the Supreme Court in Price Waterhouse. However, I do not think that Congress should
follow option 1 above, overturning Desert Palace or preserving the pretext analysis.
Regardless of whether one likes the McDonnell Douglas pretext or mixed-motives proof
structure better, the two proof structures were divided by a chimerical line that no one
really understood or applied effectively. As the Ninth Circuit explained in its en banc
opinion in Desert Palace,106 there were several approaches applied by the various circuits
to defining the direct-circumstantial dividing line. The suggestion of a new dividing line,
such as single motive and mixed-motives cases, is not any more helpful because all cases
present themselves as potential mixed-motives cases when the employer introduces
evidence of its legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason. Thus, Desert Palace actually did a
good thing by erasing an ineffective and artificial dividing line even if it misinterpreted
what Congress intended to do in the 1991 Act.
2. Congress Should Not Codify a Proof Structure That Merges Pretext and Mixed
Motives
How about option 2—codifying the Rachid solution of merging proof structures?
Congress should consider this as an option, but ultimately, I recommend rejecting it. The
first thing that favors it is that it would preserve an analysis that the courts love and to
which they desperately are clinging. This is no small reason to preserve it. Courts have a
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rich body of case law and experience with it. Second, one can observe that if plaintiffs
have the option of going the pretext route at stage three rather than motivating factor,
they may avoid the introduction of the same-decision defense and the limitation of
remedies if that defense is successful.107 However, that poses the additional problem of
what a plaintiff must do to preclude the same-decision defense in a given case and how
the court makes that decision; the issue of the dividing line reemerges.108
The merged analysis and the preservation of the pretext analysis share several
negatives. First, the pretext analysis is more difficult for plaintiffs to satisfy than the
motivating factor standard of the mixed-motives proof structure. Although there is a
debate about what level of causation the pretext analysis entails,109 it should suffice to
say that it has been the understanding since Price Waterhouse that the mixed-motives
proof structure was intended to give plaintiffs an advantage over plaintiffs proceeding
under pretext, at least at the prima facie case stage, and plaintiffs have sought the mixed-
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motives analysis, believing it to be favorable.110 If you tell a plaintiff that she can prevail
by proving either motivating factor or pretext, you may as well dispense with pretext.111
Second, the McDonnell Douglas analysis, notwithstanding its long service, has
significant problems. The prima facie case is the biggest problem. It was established and
has remained low and easy to satisfy112 and consequently is not predictive of whether a
plaintiff has a case on which she is likely to prevail at trial or even survive summary
judgment.113 All one has to prove essentially is that there is a job and the plaintiff is
basically qualified for it. The Supreme Court considered raising the requirements for the
prima facie case and perhaps attempted to do so in Texas Department of Community
Affairs v. Burdine,114 but failed to do so. The easily satisfied prima facie case seems to be
the reason that many courts have imposed an additional background circumstances
requirement in reverse discrimination cases; the light prima facie case does not support
an inference of prohibited discrimination against a plaintiff who is not a member of a
group against which there has been a history of discrimination.115
A federal court of appeals recently expressed the futility and frustration of the
McDonnell Douglas prima facie case:
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Much ink has been spilled regarding the proper contours of the primafacie-case aspect of McDonnell Douglas. But as we read the Supreme
Court precedents . . . the prima facie case is a largely unnecessary
sideshow. It has not benefited employees or employers; nor has it
simplified or expedited court proceedings. In fact it has done exactly the
opposite, spawning enormous confusion and wasting litigant and judicial
resources.116
A rejoinder to the futility of the prima facie case is that it forces an employer, which
generally may fire employees at will, to offer a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for
an adverse employment action, thus giving the plaintiff a “target.”117 The short answer to
this is that, regardless of employment at will, almost every employer that is sued for
discrimination offers a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason, and this would be true
without stages one and two of the pretext proof structure.
While part two of the pretext analysis, legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason, has
not been very problematic, the long-running debate about part three demonstrates another
problem with the analysis. The pretext-only/pretext plus debate was waged in law review
articles and Supreme Court decisions.,118 The Supreme Court eventually in Reeves v.
Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc. left us with no categorical answer: that is, the Court
said that evidence of pretext ordinarily would be enough to survive summary judgment
and judgment as a matter of law, but not necessarily always.119 One may think that we
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can live with the Reeves interpretation of the third stage, but problems remain with the
meaning and effect of pretext.
In the end, Congress should reject a merged proof structure or the preservation of
pretext as a proof structure because 1) the two proof structures have a history of operating
as two different analyses and cannot be blended effectively; and 2) there are enough
problems with the pretext analysis that it should not be retained.
3. Congress Should Adopt One Statutory Proof Structure Applicable to All
Disparate Treatment Cases
The issue all along has been what must a plaintiff do to prove that employment
discrimination occurred because of race, sex, etc. The Supreme Court and lower courts
have addressed this issue in terms of standards of causation. Congress installed a
statutory standard in the 1991 Act: “motivating factor.” The second stage of the analysis
provides that employers may avail themselves of the same-decision defense, which if the
defendant is successful, will limit remedies, eliminating all monetary remedies to the
plaintiff. If Congress were to follow my recommendations and eliminate the pretext
proof structure and choose to establish one statutory proof structure for all disparate
treatment cases, the current statutory mixed-motives structure seems to be a good starting
point. Because it is itself a modification of the Price Waterhouse mixed-motives
analysis, courts have experience applying it. But before recommending that Congress
simply amend the statute to say the current statutory mixed-motives analysis applies to all
intentional discrimination cases, it is worth asking whether changes should be made in
light of the fact that the pretext proof structure will be gone. In the 1991 Act, Congress
clearly indicated the way in which it wished to modify the Price Waterhouse mixed-
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motives analysis. However, if Congress also had thought it were abolishing the pretext
analysis and replacing it with a unified analysis, it might have done things differently.
Thus, Congress should consider modifications to the current statutory proof structure.
a. Congress Should Consider the Standard of Causation in the Plaintiff’s
Prima Facie Case
When Congress passed the 1991 Act it chose “motivating factor” as the standard
of causation from the Price Waterhouse plurality opinion rather than “substantial factor”
from Justice O’Connor’s Price Waterhouse concurrence. Does the express abrogation of
pretext and adoption of a unified proof structure call for the adoption of a different and
more demanding standard of causation, such as substantial factor? That is a policy
question for Congress, but I think the best answer is for Congress to stay with
“motivating factor” for at least two reasons. First, Congress should not amend the
employment discrimination statutes to make it harder for plaintiffs to recover. The data
indicates that employment discrimination cases are harder for plaintiffs to win than most
other civil litigation.120 Second, the second stage of the statutory mixed-motives proof
structure, the same-decision defense, incorporates a but-for causation standard (with the
burden on the defendant) for the purpose of limiting liability.121 Thus, the current
analysis has a lenient causation standard at the first stage and a more stringent standard at
the second stage. These causation standards should be maintained.
b. Congress Should Change the Effect of the Same-Decision Defense
Under Price Waterhouse, the same-decision defense at stage two was a complete
defense to liability. In the 1991 Act, Congress changed that and made it more favorable
120
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to plaintiffs by making same decision a limitation on remedies rather than a complete
defense. However, the limitation on remedies is substantial, leaving the plaintiff without
any money if the defendant prevails on same decision. When the mixed-motive proof
structure was applicable to only a subset of disparate treatment cases, that significant
limitation was perhaps not so troublesome, and after all, Congress had modified it from a
complete defense. As the next step in the evolution of proof structures, as Congress
makes mixed motives the only proof structure applicable in disparate treatment cases,
Congress needs to alter the same-decision defense. What should be the effect when a
plaintiff proves that a protected characteristic was a motivating factor and the defendant
proves that the characteristic was not a but-for cause? Congress could reduce the remedy
limitation, making it possible for a plaintiff to recover a monetary remedy. I recommend
one of two possibilities: 1) the same-decision defense cuts off compensatory and punitive
damages and injunctive relief of reinstatement (instatement, promotion, etc.) and front
pay, but not backpay; or 2) the same-decision defense cuts off punitive damages and
injunctive relief such as reinstatement, but not backpay and compensatory damages. I
favor the second of these options because the remedy for disparate treatment should
provide make-whole relief for wages lost and compensation for emotional distress
injuries. This is the result that seems most consistent with the 1991 Act’s enhancing of
the remedies available under Title VII and the ADA by providing for damages (subject to
a cap). Yet another possibility for modifying the same-decision defense may stem from
legislation that already has been introduced in Congress. The proposed Civil Rights Act
of 2008122 would remove the damage caps created by the 1991 Act.123 If that were to
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become the law generally, Congress could modify the same-decision defense to provide
that when the defendant satisfies it, the cap on compensatory and punitive damages
would become applicable.124
c. Congress Should Adopt the Modified Mixed-Motives Structure for All
Cases (and Not Modify it for Reverse Discrimination Cases)
The issue of whether and how to modify the proof structure in disparate
treatment reverse discrimination cases is important and contentious. As discussed
above, courts and others on both sides of this issue can become exorcised.125
Indeed, this is an issue on which employment discrimination law can look very
unfair to the general public. Fortunately, by adopting a single proof structure
based on the current mixed-motives analysis, this problem can be obviated.
Courts have adopted the background circumstances requirement in large part
because of the very easily satisfied prima face case of the McDonnell Douglas
pretext analysis. The motivating factor standard (or substantial factor, if Congress
so chooses) seems an adequate standard for all discrimination cases, traditional or
reverse, with no need for background circumstances. Although background
circumstances could perhaps be required under a motivating factor standard, there
is no case law on this issue. Moreover, it is the specificity of the elements of the
pretext structure that suggests the need for and accommodates the addition of
background circumstances as an additional element. It is the nonspecificity of a
123
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“motivating factor” standard that invites introduction of all relevant evidence but
accommodates no additional elements.126
d. Congress Should Provide that the New Codified Proof Structure
Applies to Disparate Treatment Claims Under All the Federal Employment
Discrimination Laws
The idea that a Price Waterhouse version of the mixed-motives analysis
applies to age discrimination claims under the ADEA is based on the fact that
Congress in the 1991 Act did not amend the ADEA.127 While the point is
debatable, Congress should put it to rest by expressly providing that the one new
proof structure applies to disparate treatment claims under Title VII, Section
1981, the ADEA, and the ADA. There is no reason why intentional
discrimination cases should be analyzed differently under these statutes.
Although the disparate impact analysis is a bit different under Title VII and the
ADEA,128 that is because the ADEA expressly provides for a different defense:
“reasonable factors other than age” rather than business necessity/job relatedness.
There is no reason in statutory language or policy that supports adopting a
different proof structure for intentional discrimination cases. The Fifth Circuit
addressed this issue in Rachid v. Jack in the Box129 when it applied its modified
McDonnell Douglas analysis to an age case, reasoning that any changes wrought
by Desert Palace v. Costa were intended by the Court to apply equally to the
126
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ADEA. The similarity in language and purpose among the discrimination statutes
should provide Congress adequate reason to make one proof structure applicable
to all. If more reason is needed, simplicity and economy should be considered
desirable bonuses. Employment discrimination law is complicated enough.
C. Fixing Disparate Impact
The Supreme Court has described disparate treatment as the most easily
understood type of discrimination. This suggests that disparate impact is not as easily
understood. Nor is it as easily fixed. Controversial from its origins, it has remained so,
even after codification by the Civil Rights Act of 1991. It has been suggested recently
that development of disparate impact may have been a mistake that stunted the
development of a more robust disparate treatment theory.130 While it is interesting to
ponder whether disparate impact should have been recognized and query how effective it
is today, my task is repairing the proof structure, not abrogating the theory. First, even if
we concluded that disparate impact either has too many problems or is not sufficiently
effective in practice to justify repairs, one can only imagine the political firestorm that
would be generated by a proposal to legislatively abolish disparate impact. Although
firestorms are sometimes needed, the damage wrought by this one would be too great.
Generally, it would be seen as retrenchment in U.S. employment discrimination law, and
that is too large a price to pay. Moreover, it is worth noting that many other nations and
international organizations recognize the disparate impact theory of discrimination, and
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“[t]he international marketplace of legal ideas provides a means of testing the value of a
concept.”131
One more matter before moving to repairing the three parts of the disparate
impact proof structure: Should Congress provide that disparate impact is not applicable
in cases of reverse discrimination? It is tempting to recommend this because the theory
was explained by the Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co. as knocking down artificial
barriers intended to keep out those against whom discrimination has been practiced
historically.132 On balance, however, Congress should resist the temptation to limit
disparate impact’s applicability to traditional discrimination cases. First, disparate impact
is controversial enough as it is, raising concerns about affirmative action and quotas. One
of the most divisive things that can be done is to flaunt that employment discrimination
law is not always status blind or “color blind.” Although that clearly is true, it is an
unpopular idea.133 Thus, limiting disparate impact likely would harm the “moral
authority” of employment discrimination law in the view of the public. Second (and a
related point), because it is so divisive, the restriction of disparate impact to traditional
discrimination claims is not politically feasible. Congress should not do it because it is
too controversial to pass, and even raising it could jeopardize other needed repairs
discussed herein. Third, there is the concern, at least, that such a restriction would be
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unconstitutional.134 At a minimum, the limiting of disparate impact to traditional
discrimination cases would be constitutionally challenged. Whether it withstood the
challenge, the public debate on this controversial and misunderstood issue would impugn
employment discrimination law.
1. Harmonizing Title VII and ADEA Differences
An initial matter to note here is to specify differences that may exist in the Title
VII and the ADEA versions of disparate impact, whether statutory or case law developed
differences. There may be a difference in the prima facie cases of the Title VII version
and the ADEA version, and there is a statutory distinction in the defenses.
If the prima facie cases are different, it is a difference developed in the case law.
When the Supreme Court recognized the applicability of disparate impact to age
discrimination in Smith v. City of Jackson, the Court stated that, because the Civil Rights
Act of 1991 did not amend the ADEA, it is the pre-1991 Wards Cove version of disparate
impact that applies under the ADEA.135 What that meant was not at all clear. The Court
revisited that statement in its decision in Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Lab., in
which the Court explained the Smith statement as relating to “a plaintiff-employee’s
burden of identifying which particular practice allegedly cause an observed disparate
impact.”136 Curiously, although the Civil Rights Act of 1991 amended Title VII to
overturn some parts of Wards Cove,137 the Act seems to preserve the requirement that a
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plaintiff identify a specific practice.138 Thus, the meaning of the reference to the Wards
Cove version of disparate impact in Smith v. City of Jackson was not effectively clarified
in Meacham. The Court also explained in Meacham that the statement about Wards Cove
may have referred to the fact that disparate impact under the ADEA is narrower than
under Title VII.139 As the Court points out in Smith, however, ADEA disparate impact
theory is rendered narrower by the Court’s interpretation of the reasonable-factors-otherthan age defense as being less onerous for defendants to satisfy than the business
necessity/job relatedness defense of Title VII.140 Ultimately, I see no reason for Congress
to differentiate between the prima facie case for disparate impact under the ADEA and
Title VII. If Congress agrees with the Supreme Court’s statements in Smith and
Meacham that disparate impact is meant to be narrower under the ADEA than under Title
VII, that result can be maintained by leaving in place the Court’s statements regarding the
comparative stringency of the defenses.
The other difference between disparate impact under Title VII and the ADEA is
the defense. Under Title VII, it is business necessity/job relatedness, and under the
ADEA it is reasonable factors other than age (RFOA). This is established in the express
language of the statutes. The Supreme Court pointed out this difference in Smith v. City
of Jackson141 and Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory142 in explaining that
plaintiffs will have more difficulty prevailing on disparate impact under the ADEA than
under Title VII. If Congress wishes to change this result, it could amend the ADEA to
138
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replace the RFOA defense with the same revamped business necessity defense that I
describe below for Title VII. However, if Congress agrees that it should be more difficult
to win disparate impact claims under the ADEA, it should leave the RFOA defense as is.
My guess is that there would be political pressure to harmonize the proof structures, both
because there are powerful lobbying interests that support legislation protecting older
persons, and because the reason for the distinction is not obvious. Simplicity and
“nondiscrimination” favor a uniform proof structure. Thus, I recommend that Congress
repeal the RFOA defense and replace it with the new business necessity defense that I
recommend for Title VII.
2. Fixing the Three Parts of the Prima Facie Case
The three parts of the prima facie case fit together as follows: 1) particular
employment practice 2) causes 3) a disparate impact. The first and last elements are
problematic, but it seems to me that the last one is the one Congress needs to repair. As
to the first element, Congress could change the requirement that the plaintiff identify a
“particular” employment practice, but I think there are few good legislative solutions.
What constitutes a sufficiently specific practice has been challenging in Title VII cases as
well as in ADEA cases. For example, in EEOC v. Joe’s Stone Crab, a Title VII sex
discrimination case, the majority and dissent disagreed about whether the employer’s
hiring procedure constituted a particular employment practice.143 In Smith v. City of
Jackson, the Supreme Court, while recognizing the applicability of disparate impact to
age discrimination, held that the city’s pay plan designed to give larger raises to less
senior police officers was not a “specific test, requirement, or practice within the pay plan
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that has an adverse impact on older workers.”144 This uncertainty and caution regarding
what constitutes a specific employment practice may be traceable to the Court’s grudging
holding in Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust that disparate impact applies to subjective
practices as well as objective practices and criteria,145 and the holding in Wards Cove that
plaintiffs must link a particular practice with the impact it causes and may not attack a
bundle of practices.146
I don’t recommend that Congress do anything to modify the requirement of
plaintiffs identifying a particular employment practice. Congress could eliminate the
requirement of identifying a particular practice and even repeal the exception, thus
permitting plaintiffs to target a bundle of practices. However, Congress was not so
inclined in 1991, even when overturning most of Wards Cove, and I doubt it will be now.
The part of the prima facie case that needs clarification is the third part. In what
group must disparate impact be established? The question raised by Livingston v.
Roadway Express147 needs to be answered. Is a plaintiff required to prove an impact
manifested in the employer’s workforce? Or is it sufficient for a plaintiff to prove that a
practice would produce a disparate impact in a group that could apply for and hold the
job at issue—a hypothetical labor pool from the general population?148 The answer
should be the latter under the reading of Connecticut v. Teal that I advocate, although
Teal might be read more narrowly. I think Congress should add language to the proof
structure to state that the practice must cause a disparate impact manifested in the actual
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workforce or in the actual or an alternative relevant labor pool. Congress could refer to
Livingston and reject the holding of the case.
3. Fixing the Defense of Business Necessity/Job Relatedness
It is not obvious that a major repair is needed here as courts have worked fairly
well with what they were given. However, Congress handled it so badly in the 1991 Act
that the defense should be repaired. Rather than explaining the meaning of job
relatedness and business necessity, Congress included a section in the Act that referred to
an interpretive memorandum for all standards referring to Wards Cove.149 That
memorandum provides that “[t]he terms ‘business necessity’ and ‘job related’ are
intended to reflect the concepts enunciated by the Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., and in the other Supreme Court decisions prior to Wards Cove Packing Co.
v. Atonio.” With this statutory language, some have even argued that the 1991 Act did
not change the Wards Cove version of the affirmative defense.150 Congress can and
should provide more clarity than this.
The first problem with the business necessity/job relatedness defense is easily
fixed. Job related should be dropped. Business necessity is the more rigorous standard,
and usually it includes job relatedness. There may be some employment practices that
satisfy business necessity, but not job relatedness. For example, a court may conclude
that a nonfraternization or antinepotism policy is a business necessity, although such a
policy may not be job related in a strict sense. Still, Congress should simplify this
149
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standard by deleting job relatedness. Most of the case law deals with the issue of
business necessity, not job relatedness.
The second problem is the uncertainty of what business necessity means—how to
define it. At one end of the spectrum is a rigorous (harder-to-satisfy) standard—a
practice is a business necessity if it is or determines “minimum qualifications that are
necessary for the successful performance of the job in question successfully.”151 At the
other end is a less rigorous ( more easily satisfied) standard such as the one articulated in
Wards Cove—“serves, in a significant way, the legitimate employment goals of the
employer.”152 As judges and commentators have explained, there was no settled
definition for business necessity standard before Wards Cove.153 A dissenting judge in
Lanning v. v. Southeastern Pa. Transportation Authority described the standard as
variable, depending on the nature of the job, with employers benefiting from the more
deferential standard particularly in jobs involving safety issues.154 Arguments can be
made for any of the definitions of business necessity and for leaving the courts the
flexibility to apply a sliding scale to different types of jobs. Although this problem is not
a catastrophic failure, Congress should repair what it mishandled in 1991. I recommend
that Congress adopt the stringent standard for business necessity. Although that standard
may not seem to give adequate deference to the judgment of employers in some types of
jobs, which the sliding scale can accommodate, the next recommendation that I make
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below, regarding alternative employment practices, should soften the blow and
ameliorate that concern.
4. Fixing Alternative Employment Practice
It is difficult to conceptualize how a court meaningfully and sensibly can evaluate
business necessity without taking into account the prospect of alternative practices.
Particularly under a stringent standard of business necessity, how can one determine that
a practice is necessary unless one considers possible alternative practices? For example,
in Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, after deciding that the clean-shaven policy was a
business necessity for firefighters, the Eleventh Circuit gave short shrift to the plaintiff’s
argument that a shaving clinic, permitting shadow beards, was an alternative employment
practice.155 The court explained that alternative employment practice necessarily was
intertwined with business necessity: “As we have explained above in addressing the
City’s business necessity defense, the firefighters have failed to create a genuine issue
that shadow beards are safe.”156
Curiously, the unusual drafting of the provision codifying disparate impact in the
Civil Rights Act of 1991 does not even seem to create a three-part proof structure: it
provides that a defendant is liable if a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case unless a
defendant “demonstrate(s)” business necessity and job related or the plaintiff proves
alternative employment practice.157 It is confusing, but Congress should amend Title VII
to provide that alternative employment practices is a factor to be taken into account in
evaluating business necessity.

155

Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112 (11th Cir. 1993).
Id. at 1122.
157
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i)-(ii).
156

49

There is more that Congress might do with alternative employment practice, but I
do not recommending doing more. For example, it is understood that the alternative
practice should be less discriminatory and still accomplish the employer’s objective.
This raises two salient issues: 1) How much less discriminatory must the alternative
practice be?; and 2) How effective must the alternative be in accomplishing the
employer’s objective (i.e., Must it be equally effective)? Although these are important
issues under alternative employment practice, I think they are difficult to address in
legislation and should be left to courts to work out.
IV. CONCLUSION
The proof structures of disparate treatment (pretext and mixed motives) and
disparate impact form the engine of employment discrimination law. They are used to
draft pleadings, to conduct discovery, to move for summary judgment, to organize
evidence for presentation at trial, to move for judgment as a matter of law, and to craft
jury instructions. Although these analyses are primarily about evidence and procedure,
they have become the focal point of discrimination law and have shaped how we think
about the substance of discrimination “because of” protected characteristics. Over the
life of employment discrimination law, the proof structures have evolved and been
modified by the Supreme Court, the lower courts, and Congress. Congress last
intervened to fix the proof structures when it passed the Civil Rights Act of 1991. Since
that time, many issues have developed that have left the proof structures sputtering. It is
now so bad that judges do not know how to analyze motions for summary judgment or
properly instruct juries. It is time for Congress to step in again and fix employment
discrimination law. No repair could be more important than a thorough checking and
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servicing of the proof structures. With that repair, employment discrimination law will
be good for many more miles. While considering a number of changes to employment
discrimination law, Congress should focus on job #1—fixing the engine.
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